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LINK TO POLICY ADOPTED: 
see Steel Industry Authority Act 1983 (repealed in 
1999); The Iron Ore Beneficiation Agreement Act; 
The Iron Ore Direct Reduced Iron Agreement Act
KEY COMMODITIES: 
Coal (world leader), bauxite, alumina, iron ore, 
uranium, zinc, LNG1
TOTAL NATURAL RESOURCE RENTS  
(AS % OF GDP) (2015): 
4.8 per cent2 
NATIONAL EXTRACTIVES COMPANY: 
N/A (although a number of large multinational 
mining firms are based in Australia, including BHP 
Billiton, Rio Tinto, Fortescue Metals Group and 
Newcrest Mining)
UNDP HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX VALUE (2016): 
0.939 (Global Rank 2)3
DIRECT EMPLOYMENT IN MINING SECTOR (2014): 
267,700 (2.3 per cent of total workforce)4
1 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science. (2017). Australian mineral commodities. Canberra, Australia: Government of Australia. Retrieved from 
https://industry.gov.au/resource/Mining/AustralianMineralCommodities/Pages/default.aspx
2 World Bank Group. (2017). Total natural resource rents (% of GDP). Washington, DC. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.
TOTL.RT.ZS
3 United Nations Development Programme. (2016). Human Development Reports: Australia. Geneva, Switzerland. Retrieved from http://hdr.undp.org/en/
countries/profiles/AUS.
4 Department of Employment. (2014). Industry outlook: Mining. Canberra, Australia: Australian Government. Retrieved from https://cica.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2014-Mining-Industry-Employment-Outlook1.pdf 
Australia was successful in establishing a domestic 
steel industry that fully met the domestic demand 
for steel for well over 80 years, leveraging locations 
with close proximity to inputs, easy access to 
markets, availability to labour and relatively low 
transport costs. The industry was supported by 
strong government intervention in the form of steel 
import restrictions and bounties. An export ban 
on iron ore was in place from 1938 to 1960. The 
government also partnered with steel producers 
and the iron ore sector as a co-investor in 
supporting infrastructure. 
The government’s intervention succeeded 
in building up the industry. However, after 
protective barriers were lifted in 2011, and BHP 
was increasingly forced to compete with other 
international producers, it became clear that 
the industry was not competitive enough. The 
increasingly globalized steel market, global 
overcapacity, a high Australian dollar, and the 
2fallout from the 2008 financial crisis all contributed 
to the post-protection demise of the steel industry 
in Australia. Ultimately, despite the abundance of 
key inputs for steel production and a highly skilled 
work force, Australia has not managed to develop 
its steel production capacity much beyond what is 
needed to service domestic demand. However, the 
country provides an interesting counterfactual for 
resource-rich countries given that it has developed 
without following the downstream beneficiation 
pathway.
RISE AND FALL OF THE 
DOMESTIC STEEL INDUSTRY
The Australian iron and steel industry emerged when 
Broken Hill Proprietary’s (BHP) Newcastle iron works 
began production in 1915.5 The Newcastle plant was 
located strategically close to coking coal reserves 
and the primary market in Australia. Furthermore, 
the plant had good access to port facilities to 
receive iron ore inputs from Southern Australia.6 
The Newcastle plant started operations as World 
War I broke out, which resulted in increased steel 
demand from the armaments industry and limited 
international supply.
After the end of the war, the government passed 
the Tariff Act of 1921, which set the stage for high 
5 Wills, N.R. (1950). The growth of the Australian iron and steel industry. The Geographical Journal 115(4), 208–18.
6 Ibid.
7 Zierer, C.M. (1940). The Australian iron and steel industry as a functional unit. Geographical Review 30(4), 649–59.
8 Australia Bureau of Statistics. (1928). Year Book Australia, No 21, 1928. Retrieved from http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/
allprimarymainfeatures/82ECFA7EC13F48E8CA2573CD00049838?opendocument
9 Farrell, R. (2008). Japanese investment in the world economy: A study of strategic themes in the internationalization of Japanese industry. 
Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar.
10 Golledge, R.G. (1964). Decentralization and the re-orientation in the Australian iron and steel industry. Geography 46(4), 364–68.
protective tariffs on imports of iron and steel to 
protect the steel producers as well as the numerous 
secondary industries that had been established 
during the war.7 In addition, the government passed 
the Iron and Steel Products Bounty Act of 1922, 
which granted bounties (direct subsidies taking the 
form of an annual lump sum payment) to industries 
making fencing wire, galvanized sheets, wire-netting 
and traction engines in Australia.8
During the 1930s, BHP became a monopoly 
producer in the iron and steel industry through 
takeovers, vertical integration, rationalization and 
modernization.  In 1938, the government imposed the 
Iron Ore Export Embargo on the eve of World War 
II to prevent the Japanese from importing ore from 
Yampi Sound in Western Australia.9 This embargo 
remained in place until 1960. 
With the relaxation of the embargo, iron ore output 
expanded by 60 per cent, with production doubling 
in Western Australia toward the late 1960s. Several 
pelletizing plants were established at Dampier 
and Whyalla in South Australia, and Port Latta in 
Tasmania. The pellets were mostly destined for 
export to Japan. By 1963, 11 blast furnaces were 
operating in Australia—four at Port Kembla, four at 
Newcastle in New South Wales, 
two at Wundowie in Western 
Australia, and one at Whyalla, 
South Australia. Production of 
pig iron reached record levels and 
the annual steelmaking capacity 
was in excess of 5 million tons.10 
The 1970s continued to be a 
prosperous period with increased 
production and exports. While 
most other OECD countries 
experienced a drop in steel 
consumption during these years, 
Australia enjoyed an increase due to the demand 
coming from the expansion of the mining industry. 
During the 1930s, BHP became a 
monopoly producer in the iron and 
steel industry through takeovers, 
vertical integration, rationalization 
and modernization
3The 1980s, however, marked the end of the booming 
steel sector and the hegemony of BHP. The company 
started accumulating losses due to a downturn 
in the domestic and international markets. Due 
to the protection of the sector over the years, its 
operations were characterized by low productivity. At 
the same time, input costs were increasing, and steel 
imports started penetrating the domestic market.11
DEMISE OF THE STEEL 
INDUSTRY DESPITE A SPATE OF 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS
BHP reacted by reducing production, cutting 3,100 
jobs and postponing investment. The company 
threatened the government with refusing to 
make any further modernization investments in 
its production capacity until import quotas were 
imposed that would guarantee 80 to 90 per cent 
of the market share to domestic producers.12 As 
the second-largest employer in the country, BHP 
had considerable influence. However, there was 
fear that additional protective measures would 
result in higher steel prices. The ensuing Steel 
Plan “tied government intervention in the form 
of a guaranteed market share and bounties to 
corresponding corporate commitments and union 
undertakings for industry harmony.”13
The plan included:
• A safety mechanism for a review of 
government assistance if the market share 
of domestic producers fell below 80 per cent 
or rose above 90 per cent.
• The inclusion of a mechanism to deal with 
anti-dumping issues in an expedited manner. 
• Subsidies for a period of five years for steel 
used in the domestic production of specific 
products. 






16 Iron Ore Beneficiation (BHP) Agreement Act 1996 (WA). Retrieved from https://www.slp.wa.gov.au/pco/prod/filestore.nsf/FileURL/mrdoc_23084.
pdf/$FILE/Iron%20Ore%20Beneficiation%20(Bhp)%20Agreement%20Act%201996%20-%20%5B01-d0-06%5D.pdf?OpenElement
• The state governments of New South Wales 
and South Australia—where the steel works 
were located—were asked to restrict charges 
associated with electricity, freight and 
payroll taxes.14
In exchange, BHP promised not to shut down its 
integrated steel works and to limit redundancies 
during the five-year period of the Steel Plan, 
as well as to invest AUD 800 million in capital 
improvements to increase productivity and 
efficiency. The unions agreed to negotiate all wage 
increases in line with the Prices and Incomes Accord. 
The Steel Industry Authority (SIA) was established to 
monitor the implementation of the Plan.
Helped by the end of the recession and the 
depreciation of the Australian dollar by the end of 
1983, BHP began reporting profits again. By the end 
of the 1980s, BHP became the third most profitable 
steel producer globally, behind China Steel and 
Nisshin. BHP benefited from an average domestic 
market share of 88 per cent and had managed to 
increase its productivity from 200 to 250 metric 
tons per employee/year (this level remained below 
the average of 400 metric tons per employee/year 
of countries like South Korea, though).15 In light of 
this recovery, the government cut the subsidies by 
20 per cent.
However, in the 1990s, stagnant domestic steel 
production and declining exports of iron and steel 
retriggered state intervention. In 1996, the State of 
Western Australia enacted two legislative measures 
to foster downstream beneficiation by requiring 
major exporters of iron ore to invest in beneficiation 
beyond that of just iron ore concentration and 
pelletization. The Iron Ore Beneficiation Agreement 
Act and The Iron Ore Direct Reduced Iron Agreement 
Act were passed “for the purpose of promoting 
employment opportunity and industrial development 
and in particular the establishment of further 
processing facilities in Western Australia.”16
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These acts prompted BHP to build the AUD 2.6 
billion Boodarie hot briquetted iron plant in 1996 
and Rio Tinto to invest AUS 400 million in a pig iron 
plant in Kwinana in 2003. Both projects employed 
experimental processing technologies, but never 
reached economic viability and were written off. In 
light of these experiences, the Western Australian 
Government repealed the beneficiation acts in 2011 
and renegotiated its agreements with Rio Tinto and 
BHP, dropping the requirement for beneficiation, but 
requiring higher royalty rates in return. 
Despite efforts toward improving productivity and 
the implementation of cost reductions, the industry 
has been struggling ever since, shedding jobs and 
shutting operations.17 Contributing to the demise of 
the steel industry after the financial crisis in 2008 
was the high Australian dollar. In 2011 BlueScope 
(previously BHP) stopped exporting steel and closed 
some of its production facilities at the Port Kembla 
Steelworks and Western Port. In October 2015, 
a further 500 jobs were cut.18 Unions have been 
accusing China of steel dumping and have been 
calling on the government to impose restrictions.19
17 Arrium Mining and Materials. (2015). The future of Australia’s steel industry (Submission to the Senate Economics Committee’s Inquiry Into the 
Future Sustainability of the Australian Steel Industry). Retrieved from www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=0a0cfc3f-1de6-4b4b-bd6b-
3bfa2d66f17d&subId=409465
18 Illawarra Business Chamber. (2015).  The future of Australia’s steel industry (Submission to the Senate Economics Committee’s Inquiry Into the 
Future Sustainability of the Australian Steel Industry). Retrieved from www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=54aa26e3-cb13-465b-b230-
4d940ba5235a&subId=409045
19 Kelly, J. (2017, July 14). Union warning on Chinese plans to dump excess steel in Australia. The Australian.
KEY LESSONS
• Building a downstream industry will require 
government intervention and protective 
measures such as export restrictions. 
However, these may be illegal under the 
WTO.
• In the long run, government support and 
protectionism should be lifted to promote 
competitiveness and avoid draining public 
funds.
• Succeeding with downstream policies 
requires a sophisticated industrial policy 
grounded in sound comparative advantages 
and knowledge of the capabilities of the 
market to avoid imposing downstream 
requirements that do not make economic 
sense.
• International supply forecasts and prospects 
of other government’s actions to support 
and protect the downstream sector need 
to be considered prior to embarking on 
industrial policies.
